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Abstract. The security of cryptographic algorithms can be considered
in two contexts. On the one hand, these algorithms can be proven se-
cure mathematically. On the other hand, physical attacks can weaken the
implementation of an algorithm yet proven secure. Under the common
name of physical attacks, different attacks are regrouped: side channel
attacks and fault injection attacks. This paper presents a common for-
malism for these attacks and highlights their underlying principles. All
physical attacks on symmetric algorithms can be described with a 3-step
process. Moreover it is possible to compare different physical attacks, by
separating the theoretical attack path and the experimental parts of the
attacks.
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1 Introduction
When discussing about the security of a cryptographic algorithm, numer-
ous tools allow the cryptographers to prove the security of a cipher. Unfortu-
nately those tools do not consider the interaction of the computing unit with
its physical environment. Physical attacks are a real threat, even for crypto-
graphic algorithms proved secure mathematically. Physical attacks are divided
in two families: the side channel attacks and the fault injection attacks and can
target the secret key or reverse engineer the algorithm. Regrettably, no frame-
work exists that gathers physical attacks under a common formalism. Our paper
proposes one for secret key ciphers and presents a new tool to compare them.
The paper is organised as follows. In the section 2 we expose the context and
the motivations for a unifying formalism. A 3-step description of physical attacks
is given in section 3. How to compare these attacks is explained in section 4.
Some examples of the utilization of the formalism are exposed in 5. Finally the
conclusion is drawn in section 6.
2 Context
2.1 Notations and Algorithm
Our formalism is valid for secret key ciphers only. The well known algorithm
AES [1] has been chosen as an example in order to illustrate it. In this article,
the plaintext is noted T , the ciphertext is noted C, the cipher key is noted K
Advanced Encryption Standard The AES is a standard established by the
NIST [1] for symmetric key cryptography. In this paper, we focus on the 128-bits
key version of the AES. It is a block cipher, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1: Scheme of AES
Kr is the derived key used at round r. The encryption first consists in map-
ping the plaintext T of 128 bits into a two-dimensional array of bytes, called the
State. Then, after a preliminary XOR between the input and the key, AES128
executes 10 times a function that operates on the State. The operations used
during these rounds are:
– SubBytes is composed of non-linear transformations: 16 s-boxes noted SB,
working independently on individual bytes of the State.
– ShiftRows noted SR, a byte shifting operation on each row of the State.
– MixColumns noted MC, a linear matrix multiplication working on each
column of the State.
– AddRoundKey noted ARK, a byte-wise xor ⊕ between the State and Kr,
r ∈ [[0, 10]].
2.2 Physical attacks
A physical access to the circuit may give information about the internal com-
putations of the cryptographic algorithm and thus, indirectly, about secret values
in the algorithm. We distinguish physical attacks according to two criteria: their
principle and their goal.
• There are two main kinds of physical attacks, the side channel attacks and
the fault injection attacks.
– Side Channel Attacks noted SCA are based on observations of the circuit
behaviour during the computation, for example in [2,3]. Side channel attacks
exploit the fact that some physical values of a circuit depend on intermedi-
ary values of the computation. This is the so-called leakage of information
of the circuit.
– Fault Injection Attacks notes FIA consist in disturbing the circuit be-
haviour in order to alter the correct progress of the algorithm [4]. Faults are
injected into the device using various means such as laser, clock glitches,
spikes on the power supply or electromagnetic perturbations. A rougher
technique consists in modifying the circuit operation by modifying inter-
nal computations through micro-probes, or even modifying the circuit itself
using Focused Ion Beam. In this paper a faulty variable is denoted by an
asterisk ∗.
The current trend is to mix the two kinds in order to build other attacks.
These are called hybrid attacks, as for example in [5,6].
• The target or the secret noted K is the goal of the attack. The domain
of definition of the target is noted K. The target is often the cipher key K, but
physical attacks are also used to reverse engineer an algorithm, i.e. the goal is to
retrieve information on a private algorithm. An example may be an AES with
custom and secret s-boxes: in this case, the attacker knows the key and he tries
to recover the s-boxes as in section 5.6.
2.3 Motivations behind our formalism
Physical attacks add another dimension with respect to cryptanalysis: the
interaction of the implemented algorithm with the physical environment. This
work intends to be a guide to help identify the important parameters in a physical
attack, so that they can be compared. Unifying the different attacks under a same
formalism allows to deal with them with common tools.
Several works have been proposed to described them with a common frame-
work [7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14]. However these works only cover side channel attacks.
In particular, [8,14] propose to write various side channel attacks all as Dif-
ferential Power Analyses. Likewise there are frameworks for fault injection at-
tacks [15,16,17]. The improvement of our formalism is to unify the two families.
As a consequence, it becomes possible to compare side channel attacks and fault
injection attacks. In [11], Standaert et al. underline the interface between theory
and practice for side channel attacks, we enlarge this vision for both families.
Finally we want to compare the attacks between them in order to guide the
designer in the choices required to harden its implementation.
3 Description of the attacks in 3-step by the formalism
All attack on symmetric ciphers can be decomposed in the following 3-step
process.
3.1 Step 1: Campaign
An experiment E is a pair (OS , OR) of measurements called observables,
taken during the execution of the cipher algorithm of one text T with a key K.
OS is called a stimuli and OR a reaction.
A set of N experiments is called a campaign. Examples of observables are:
plaintext, ciphertext, faulty ciphertext, EM traces, power traces, signal provided
by a micro-probe, behaviour (i.e. the normal or abnormal working) of the circuit
or computation time.
A classical example of pairs of observables for a SCA is
(OS = T,OR = pow)
A classical example of pairs of observables for a FIA is
(OS = C,OR = C
∗)
The attack path is an exploitable relation R between our observables and
the target K. Inputs are K and OS and the output is OR. This relation is
composed of physical functions fj and algorithm functions gi.
OR = R(OS ,K)
R = f1 ◦ g1 ◦ · · · ◦ fn ◦ gn (1)
More precisely the gj are composed of several cipher-algorithm functions. For
example in the case of AES, gj is built with {SB, SR,MC,ARK}.
The physical functions fj cannot always be described with a mathematical
expression since they are often non deterministic. There is often only one physical
function.
3.2 Step 2: Predictions
In the attack path R there are two unknowns: the target K and the physical
functions f . To build predictions they have to be replaced, either by guesses or
models.
The attacker make guesses k on the target K. The good guess is noted kˆ.
A divide and conquer approach is generally chosen. The domain of definition of
the target, K, should be short enough so that all guesses can be tested.
For example if the target is the cipher key of an AES. Generally a round key
Kr is chosen as a target and is split in bytes. So K = [[0, 255]] and has size 256.
As already pointed out, physical functions f do not always have a mathe-
matical expression. But f can be approximated by mathematical functions m
called models. In fault injection attacks, models are called error functions and
leakage functions in side channel attacks. It is impossible to test every possible
model because of their tremendous number. Indeed each endomorphism of a set
of bits can be considered as a possible error function, so the number of these
functions is too big to be efficiently managed. Even worse, the number of leakage
functions is an infinite uncountable set. Commonly, one or a small set of models
is used.
Finally the predictions are built with the attack path described in Step 1
(section 3.1) for each guess h on the secret, where the physical functions are
replaced by models m.
1. Define K, the set of guesses k on the target K.
2. Choose one set of models m = {mj} with j ∈ [[1, n]] where n is the number
of physical functions in R, In practice, several models mi,j can be tested for
one physical function fj . There are two possibilities. The first is to use the
models separately, for example in SCA, the attacker often has the choice
between Hamming weight or Hamming distance as a model of the power
consumption. The second is to take into account all models at once. As an
example, it is possible to choose a single-bit fault in a FIA, where there are
8 models for one byte mi = 2
i with i ∈ [[0, 7]].
3. Replace the physical functions fj by models mj in the equation Eq. (1).
4. For each h, and each set of models m, compute Pm,k with the stimuli OS .
Pm,k = Rm(OS , h)
Rm = m1 ◦ g1 ◦ · · · ◦mn ◦ gn (2)
3.3 Step 3: Confrontation
For each hypothesis k and set of models m, Pm,k is confronted with respect
to OR with a distinguisher. A distinguisher is a statistic tool which is able to
find the correct guess on the target. The distinguishers highlight links between
physical functions f and mathematical models m, they are based on different
statistical criteria. Pm,k and OR can be considered as random variables. The
distinguishers return the guess kd, if kd 6= kˆ the attack has failed.
Some examples of distinguishers are listed in the following paragraph.
– Sieves and counters [4] are used essentially for fault injection attacks. They
suppose that models m are identical to the physical functions f .
– The difference of mean [2] and the correlation [3] are based on a linear
dependency between the model and the physical function.
– The entropy [18] and the mutual information [19] are based on the Shannon
information and use non-linear dependencies between the model and the
physical function.
– The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [20] is a seemingly attractive alternative to
mutual information, it is similarly able to generically compare the distribu-
tions of two samples but achieves this without explicit estimation of their
probability density functions.
– The differential cluster analysis [21] analyses the variances.
– The principal component [22] and the linear discriminant [23] use properties
of inter-class and intra-class variances.
The difference and the comparisons of these distinguishers are explained in [24].
There is an active ongoing research on the distinguishers but they are out of the
scope of this paper.
3.4 Attack step by step
Some attacks cannot directly retrieve the target. They first require to retrieve
one (or several) intermediate secret(s). In this case the 3-step approach described
in 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 is repeated many times, for different attack paths with different
targets and observables. We note as an exponent the order of the attack path.
The target Ki is an observable for the attack path Ri+1.
Ri+1(Oi+1S ,Ki+1) = Oi+1R with Ki = Oi+1S or Oi+1R
4 How to compare physical attacks ?
In this section a compare tool for all physical attacks is presented.
4.1 State of the art
The question that naturally arises is: how to compare physical attacks? They
are often compared in terms of equipments: how much they cost, what kind of
fault injections are needed. They are also compared by the computational power
of the attack they require. The number of measurements needed or the ability to
modify the circuit are also points of comparison. For example the different kinds
of fault injection possible for a given equipment are described in [25]. In the case
of side channel attacks, a lot of work has been done to compare distinguishers as
in [24]. Generally we compare different distinguishers on a same circuit or a same
distinguisher on different circuits or different models for a same distinguisher.
Indeed, as said in section 3.3 different distinguishers do not rely on the same
statistical properties.
This paper presents a different approach. The main idea is to evaluate a
physical attack in the two first steps. First in a theoretical study, the models are
evaluated independently from the physical functions i.e Rm in equation Eq. (2)
is studied. Only in a second time the uncertainty due to the use of experimental
apparatus is taken into account. The adequacy of the models with respect to the
physical functions is evaluated, but without distinguishers, since the comparison
of physical attacks is performed before the step of confrontation 3.3.
4.2 Oracle
In the second step 3.2 of our formalism, the predictions are computed. The
set of predictions noted P, has a cardinal α (i.e. there are α predictions possible).
One has to remark that it is possible that α 6= card (K). Indeed two guesses can
have the same prediction during an attack.
Θm
OS Pm,kˆ
Fig. 2: Oracle Θm
Let Θm be an oracle associated with a set of models m as illustrated in Fig. 2
The oracle Θm returns Pm,kˆ = Rm(OS ,K) i.e the prediction which corresponds
to the good guess under models m. The required number of queries (in average)
to Θm in order to retrieve the target K is noted θ. It is a measure of how efficient
the attack path would be with the set of models m, i.e Rm.
An oracle can combine sets of models. Let m be a set of (set of) models
mi. For each mi there is an oracle Θmi . An oracle Θm can be constructed by
randomly choosing a model mi at each call and returning the result of Θmi .
There is often only one physical function used in a relation R and therefore
only one model in the set m used in Rm. Yet, several possibilities are evaluated
(e.g. 8 fault models to approximate a single-bit fault model) which form the set
m in our previous example,
mi = 2
i i ∈ [[0, 7]]
4.3 Matching Probability
This section deals with the link between observables OR and the good pre-
diction Pm,kˆ. More precisely the two codomains, for the attack path R and for
Rm are compared (for a given target K and a given set of models m). One has
to remark that the attack path R is not really a function since for a same input
OS , different outputs OR are possible. Additionally there is not necessarily a
bijection between the codomains (the prediction Pm,kˆ and the observables OR),
as it has already been shown in [7,10,11,14].
A contingency table is filled with the results of N experiments. All the possi-
ble values of Pm,kˆ are noted ρi, i ∈ [[1, α]] and the possible values of OR are noted
oj , j ∈ [[1, β]]. For each experiment E = (OS , OR), the reaction OR is stored and
Pm,kˆ is computed. Then in the contingency table, shown in Table 1, the value
at the corresponding row i is incremented (prediction is equal to ρi) and column
j (reaction is equal to oj). At the end, the value ai,j is the number of times
the attacker computed the prediction ρi in conjunction with the measurement
of the reaction oj , i.e. the number of experiments which verifies Pm,kˆ = ρi and
Or = oj .
OR = o1 OR = o2 · · · OR = oβ total
Pm,kˆ = ρ1 a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,β
∑β
j=1 a1,j
Pm,kˆ = ρ2 a2,1 a2,2 · · · a2,β
∑β
j=1 a2,j
...
...
... · · ·
...
...
Pm,kˆ = ρα aα,1 aα,2 · · · aα,β
∑β
j=1 aα,j
total
∑α
i=1 ai,1
∑α
i=1 ai,2 · · ·
∑α
i=1 ai,β N
Table 1: Contingency table of the measured OR and the predicted values Pm,kˆ
We now focus on the repeatability probability. An experience E is associated
with a pair (OR = oˆ = oj1 , Pm,kˆ = ρˆ = ρi1). What is the probability that an-
other experiment with the same observable has also the same predictive value?
This probability is noted p.
In order to estimate p, a statistical experience using the Table 1 is presented.
A first urn contains a total of N balls, specifically for each i, j, ai,j balls are
labelled with the pair (ρi, oj). It represents the Table 1. In the other hand, we
have β urns. With urn j containing ai,j balls labelled with ρi for each i. Each
urn represents a column of Table 1. The statistical experience is the following :
1. A random draw in the first urn.
The result is (oˆ = oj1 , ρˆ = ρi1).
2. A random draw in the urn j1 (j1 defined by the first draw).
The result is ρi2 .
We are interested in the probability :
p = P (ρi2 = ρi1)
P (ρi2 = ρi1 |oj1) =
N∑
i=1
a2i,J
n2
Finally we have:
p =
M∑
j=1
P (ρi2 = ρi1 |oj) · P (oj) =
M∑
j=1
(
oj
n
·
N∑
i=1
a2i,j
n2
)
(3)
This probability p is called matching probability.
4.4 A tool to compare physical attacks
The oracle θ allows to evaluate the quality of an attack path Rm with the
models m. A smaller θ means a better adequacy between the attack path and
the model. The matching probability p represents the quality of the measures
OR with respect to the predictions Pm,kˆ. A bigger p means a better adequacy
between the physical function and the model. Finally θ and p are combined to
globally evaluate the experimental attack with respect to the models.
A new oracle Θp (Fig.3) is introduced which mixes Θm and p. It returns Pm,kˆ
thank to OS but with a probability of success p. For n experimentations, the
probability to have θ successes is computed with a Bernoulli trial. The probabil-
ity P of θ or more successes in the experiment B(n, p) is given by the equation
Eq. (4):
P = P (obtain at least θ success) =
n∑
θ
(
n
θ
)
pθ · (1− p)n−θ (4)
Finally the new tool to compare the physical attacks is P for n texts. This
probability can be seen as a success rate. P depends on the models and the
measurements. Another possibility is to compute the number of experiments n
needed to have P > 0.99.
OS
Θp
success : Pm,kˆ failure
p 1− p
Fig. 3: Oracle with a probability of error p
The best attack has the biggest P for a given n.
Or the best attack has the smallest n for P > 0.99.
The improvements of this probability of success P come from the fact that it is
decomposed in two parts. So if an attack fails, it is possible to know if the model
is wrong (too different w.r.t. the reality) or if the attack path is bad.
The third step of the formalism is not used in this comparison tool. However
the choice of the distinguisher is important for an attack to succeed. In this
paper, the idea is to compare attacks before this step.
5 Examples
To illustrate our formalism description, some classic attacks on AES are
chosen. Three attacks which aim at finding a cipher key were realized on the
same programmable circuit: fpga - Xilinx Spartan3 700A. The same cipher key
A3B0D09804584269DC7FB0CDABAD57F8 and the same 5000 plaintexts were used.
5.1 Experimental protocol
In this section, the description of the acquisition benches is given.
EM bench The EM curves are acquired with the protocols described by De-
hbaoui in [26]. The EM bench is composed of a control computer, an oscilloscope,
and a commercial EM probe (with large bandwidth). At the contact of the cir-
cuit, the EM probe receives the EM emission, then sends the measurements to
the oscilloscope. A trigger signal sent by the FPGA indicates when the oscillo-
scope saves the traces. The experimental protocol is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Computer FPGA
Probe
Oscilloscope
send the traces
send the measerements
commands the FPGA
send the trigger signal probe the EM leakage
Fig. 4: Scheme of EM bench
Clock glitch bench The clock glitch bench is described in details by Zussa et al.
in [27,28]. The idea is to change the internal clock and to reduce the frequency
of the clock to obtain faults. The glitchy clock was generated using a Xilinx
Virtex-5 fpga, used as a clock source for our targeted fpga.
Fig. 5: Scheme of clock glitch bench
5.2 Example of a Side Channel Attack (SCA) on AES
The first attack presented is a classic attack by electromagnetic analysis on
the last round of the AES.
– The target is a byte of the key at round 10, K = K10. There are only 256
possible values.
– The stimuli is the ciphertext OS = C.
– The reaction is the measured electromagnetic field, OR = EM curve.
– R = f ◦ g with : f = em electromagnetic radiation and
g = SB−1 ◦ SR−1 ◦ ⊕.
The attack path is illustrated in Fig. 6
– Rm = m ◦ g with m = HD Hamming distance.
So PHD,h = HD(C, SB
−1 ◦ SR−1 ◦ (C ⊕ h))
– The distinguisher can be a difference of mean [2], a correlation [3], a mutual
information [19], a principal component [22] or a linear discriminant [23].
– The question to evaluate θ is how many pairs (C,PHD,K10) are needed in
average to recover a byte of K10 ? In this case we have θ = 4. This value
was obtained by simulating 1000000 attacks using the Hamming distance as
an input.
– For the different bytes of the round key K10, the contingency table is gener-
ated to compute the matching probability.
The OR are the measured values at the instant of the EM curves were a
correlation allows to find the value of the target and the Pm,K are Hamming
distances. The attack has not succeeded for the bytes 3 and 13. Finally, the
results are displayed in Table 2.
byte 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
p 0.22 0.22 0.21 × 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.23 × 0.21 0.22
n 43 43 45 × 43 43 45 45 47 47 45 45 45 × 45 43
Table 2: Matching probability p for the different bytes of K10 and n for P > 0.99
SB
SR
C
K10
EM
Fig. 6: Attack path of the SCA
5.3 Example of Fault Injection Attack (FIA) a on AES
This example is a classic differential fault analysis [4]. The faults are obtained
for the same list of 5000 plaintexts as in the previous attack SCA in section 5.2.
– The target is a byte of the key at round 10, K = K10. There are only 256
possible values.
– The stimuli is the ciphertext OS = C.
– The reaction is the faulty ciphertext OR = C
∗.
– R = g2 ◦ f ◦ g1 with: f = single-bit fault injection process,
g1 = SB
−1 ◦ SR−1 ◦ ⊕ and g2 = ⊕ ◦ SR ◦ SB.
The attack path is illustrated in Fig. 7
– Rm = g2 ◦ m ◦ g1 with 8 possible models, ⊕2j with j ∈ [[0, 7]], considered
together.
– The distinguisher is a sieve [4] or a counter [29].
– How many pairs (C,P⊕2i,K10) such that i is randomly chosen are needed to
recover a byte of the K10? In this case θ = 2.24 was claimed in [18]. θ is
rounded up to 3.
– For the different bytes of the round key K10, the contingency table is gener-
ated to compute the matching probability. The OR are the faulty ciphertexts
observed. The Pm,K are the faulty ciphertexts computed with the models
⊕2i. In this precise case the matching probability directly corresponds to the
uncertainty of the generated faults when a sufficient number of faults were
injected. This value does not depends on the model ⊕v nor on the key value.
As an example, a fault generator which injects two different fault values
(⊕v1 or ⊕v2) with equal probability would create a contingency table with
matching probability p = 0.5 regardless of the model ⊕v used. This is why
the Table 3 shows the matching probability for only one of the eight models
(⊕20), the other tables are identical up to a permutation of the columns.
Finally, the results are displayed in the Table 3.
byte 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
p 0.68 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.50 1.00 0.65 0.38 0.69 0.32 0.43 0.68 0.15 0.60 0.74 0.65
n 6 28 21 21 14 3 10 19 10 23 18 6 54 12 9 10
Table 3: Matching probability for the different bytes of K10 and n for P > 0.99
SB
SR
C
K10
 
C∗
Fig. 7: Attack path of DFA
5.4 Example of a hybrid attack on AES: the Fault Sentivity
Analysis (FSA) [5]
A Fault Sensitivity Analysis was performed on the FPGA with the same set-
up as the previous fault attack. But when creating a clock glitch, the difference of
a normal clock period with the glitchy clock period is a discrete multiple (value
named u) of the fixed delay 25ps. The value u was stored as the stress of the
injection process.
SB
SR
C
K10
 stress
Fig. 8: Attack path of FSA
– The target is a byte of the key at round 10, K = K10. There are only 256
possible values.
– The stimuli is the faulty ciphertext OS = C.
– The reaction is the sensitivity to the fault OR = u.
– R = f ◦ g with f = Stress which triggers the fault and
g = SB−1 ◦ SR−1 ◦ ⊕
The attack path is illustrated in Fig. 8
– Rm = m ◦ g with m = HW .
– The distinguisher is a correlation.
– The question to evaluate θ is how many pairs (C,PHW,K10) are needed in
average to recover a byte of K10. In this case we have θ = 4.0. θ is rounded
down to 4.
– For the different bytes of the round key K10, the contingency table is gener-
ated to compute the matching probability. The OR are the values u and the
Pm,K are Hamming weights. The results are displayed in the Table 4.
byte 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
p 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20
n 48 48 48 48 46 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 43 46 48 48
Table 4: Matching probability for the different bytes of K10 and n for P > 0.99
5.5 Comparison of the three attacks
The comparison of the number of experiments n required to have P > 0.99
shows that the presented FIA (section 5.3) is more efficient. Indeed, in average
it requires less experiments than the two other attacks. Additionally, for a same
attack some bytes of the key are more difficult to extract than others. The
difficulty to extract a key byte varies in the different attacks. For example bytes
3 and 13 cannot be extracted with the SCA (section 5.2), but they are easy to
extract with the FIA (section 5.3). Moreover, the byte 12 has the biggest n for
the FIA (section 5.3), but in the two other attacks it has the smallest. For each
attack, the most difficult bytes to retrieve are different.
5.6 Reverse Engineering examples
A classic SCARE (Side Channel Analysis for Reverse Engineering) attack
as in [30,31] is chosen to illustrate that our formalism is still valid for reverse
engineering attacks. An AES-like cryptosystem with customized s-boxes is cho-
sen, i.e. s-boxes are the target. One has to remark that the cipher key is often
considered known in a reverse engineering attack. We did not test this attack on
our fpga.
– The target is an s-box i.e. a boolean function b8→8, SB(x) = y. A divide
and conquer strategy is achieved by splitting the target into 8 boolean func-
tions b8 → 1.
K = b8→1 There are only 256 possible values.
– The stimuli is the plaintext OS = T .
– The reaction is the power consumption or the radiation of an electromagnetic
field, OR = EM or OR = Pow.
– R = f ◦ g with : f = EM radiation of electromagnetic field or f = Pow
power consumption and g = ⊕k0.
– Rm = m ◦ g with m = HW Hamming weight, or m = HD Hamming
distance. The two models are considered separately.
– The distinguisher is a correlation.
6 Conclusion
A new technique to compare physical attacks has been presented. This method
is able to compare all physical attacks between them, including a side channel
attack with respect to a fault injection attack. Additionally using physical at-
tacks in order to find the cipher key or in order to reverse engineer an algorithm
do not change the formalism. The main idea is to compare attacks at each step
of the attack (campaign, predictions, confrontation) and not only at the end.
The improvement comes from the fact that the attack is decomposed in three
steps, where the first two are analysed independently. In a first time, only the
models are studied with θ the average number of queries to the oracle Θm. Then
in a second time, only the predictions and the reactions are confronted, without
taking into account the distinguishers, with a matching probability p. A smaller
θ means a better adequacy between the attack path and the model. A bigger p
means a better adequacy between the physical function and the model. Finally
a new oracle Θp which combines both is introduced by creating an oracle with a
probability of failure not equal to zero. Two attacks can be compared with the
probability of success for n texts or with the number n of experiments required
to have a probability of success bigger than a chosen value. So if an attack fails,
it becomes possible to know if the model is wrong or if the attack path is bad.
It is a new approach which do not confront distinguishers. Instead the com-
parison is performed before this final step allowing to measure the effectiveness
of the other steps. Moreover in a future work we would like to extract from the
contingency table some hindsight on what distinguisher is the most likely to
work in order to extract a key.
As a perspective, our 3-step approach suggests that by modifying only one
of this step, we create a new physical attack. We suggest instead that the com-
ponents of an attack should be studied independently.
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